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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Appellant objects to Respondent's Statement of Facts as 
follows: 
1. Respondent repeatedly refers to the Appellant/ Susan 
Wagley, as "Decedent's Nurse's Aid" (Brief of Respondent/ pg. 
2, 111 & 2; pg. 6, Kl) . This is totally false and not supported 
by the record. The uncontradicted testimony is that Susan 
Wagley never worked for or administered to the Decedent.. 
(Trans, of 2/14/86 hearingr pg. 5, In. 1&2; pg. 12, In 17-22). 
Appellant believes this misstatement of facts is an attempt to 
suggest unfair influence or incapacity, although neither issue 
was ever raised below and there was no testimony to suggest 
that such was the case. 
2. Respondent asserts that she had testified that some of 
her money was in the joint accounts. (Brief of Respondent pg. 
2, K3, second sentence) She did not so testify. Her reference 
to the record (Trans 4/10/87 hearing, pg. 34, Ins. 14-25 and 
pg. 35, In. 1) is to a somewhat evasive and indirect answer to 
the question, but she finally admits it was her fathers money. 
Also, when read carefully, Respondent's testimony is that the 
money in the joint accounts was comingled with her funds only 
after Decedent's death. Respondent further testified the money 
in the joint accounts was derived from the sale of Decedent's 
-1-
home. (Trans. 4/10/87 hearing, pg. 7, In 1-13; and, pg 54, In 
5-9.) In any event, the Court found the joint accounts in the 
total amount of $18,000.00 to have been established by Decedent 
(R 173 %2) and available for payment of claims against the 
estate (R 175 116 & 18; R 176 Kl,3&6.) 
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ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENT'S POINT I, 
THE COURT IN ITS DISCRETION MAY REFUSE TO INVADE A 
JOINT PARTY BANK ACCOUNT TO MAKE UP A DEFICIENCY IN 
EXEMPT PROPERTY ALLOWANCE, 
Respondent argues that the Court may exercise discretion 
with regard to whether or to what extent to invoke U.C.A. 
§75-6-107. Respondent cites no Statutes or cases to support 
that contention. Instead, the language of the statute itself 
seems to be mandatory. 
Respondent cites U.C.A. §75-1-102 to establish that the 
primary purpose of the Probate Code is to make effective the 
intent of the Decedent in the distribution of his property. 
While certainly that is one of the primary purposes of the 
Probate Code, it is not the only purpose. In fact, served 
provisions of the Probate Code are intended to accomplish 
exactly the opposite result. These sections are instead 
designed specifically to prevent the Decedent from 
intentionally or inadvertantly distributing property of the 
Estate so as to defeat the rights of certain protected 
individuals including the surviving spouse. This is precisely 
the intent of U.C.A. §75-6-107. 
Respondent further relies on U.C.A. §75-1-103 to suggest 
that the Court is free to ignore specific provisions of the 
-3-
Code and apply unfettered discretion. It is interesting to 
note that the very Statute relied upon by Respondent begins 
with the Statement: "Unless displaced by the particular 
provisions of this Code,...". U.C.A. §75-6-107 is just such a 
particular provision of the Code contemplated by U.C.A. 
§75-1-103 in that it displaces general provisions of law 
including judicial discretion. 
In her argument concerning "Judicial Discretion11 Respondent 
relies on 20 Am. Jur.2d, Courts §69, 434, citing Chapman v. 
Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Minn. 1950): 
"Judicial discretion is the sound choosing by the 
Court, subject to the guidance of the law, between 
doing or not doing a thing, the doing of which 
cannot be demanded as an absolute right of the 
party who ask that it be done." 
Appellant agrees that a Court may exercise Judicial 
discretion in appropriate situations. However, as stated in 
the very case upon which Respondent relies, judicial discretion 
is always subject to the guidance of the law. In this case, 
the guidance of the law as set forth in U.C.A. §75-6-107,was 
ignored. 
In essence, Respondent is asking this Court to rule that 
property in a Probate action should be awarded in the same 
manner as property is divided between spouses in a divorce 
action. An opinion apparently not shared by the legislature, 
as evidenced by the enactment of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
nor previously embraced by this Court. The likely result of 
such a decision would be to add uncertainty to the law and 
encourage probate litigation and subsequent appeals, in an area 
-4-
of the law currently remarkable for the infrequent necessity of 
judicial intervention. 
RESPONDENT'S POINTS II AND III. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT' 
AND 3 
S FINDINGS 
THAT THE 
OF FACT 
FURNITURE 
SET 
OF 
FORTH 
R. C. 
IN PARAGRAPHS 
WILLEY'S HAS 
5 
A 
VALUE OF $2,558 AND IS PART OF THE PROBATE ESTATE. 
In her Brief, Respondent asserts that, "No contrary 
evidence was presented regarding the fair market value of the 
furniture purchased by R.C. Willey's." (Respondent's Brief/ 
pg. 11, In. 2-4) Quite the opposite is true. (R 154 K2; Trans, 
of 4/10/87 hearing, pg. 93 Ins 2-7) 
The burden is upon the one who would challenge the total 
value of $700.00 as estimated by the Personal Representative. 
U.C.A. §75-3-705; Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Marshall, 557 P.2d 
352, 16 Wash. App. 503. At trial, Respondent introduced 
evidence of the cost of the furniture, but no evidence as to 
the fair market value at the time of Decedent's death. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT VI . 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON MULTIPLE 
PARTY ACCOUNT FUNDS. 
Respondent argues that this issue was raised for the first 
time on appeal. This is an incorrect assertion. (R 90, Kg) and 
in fact, Respondent herself had previously objected to Susan 
Wagleys claim for interest. (R 127, K6, last sentence). 
DATED this ^ day of CSJL<— * 1987. 
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